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The Polish people have voted in favour of the 
political change: former prime minister 
Jaroslaw Kaczyński’s party Law and Justice 
(PiS) with its front-runner Beata Szydlo turned 
out strongest in the parliamentary elections 
on Sunday with almost 38 per cent of votes. 
The liberal Civic Platform (PO), headed by 
prime minister Ewa Kopacz, gained only 23.4 
per cent. Why this shift to the right? And what 
will be the consequences for Polish politics? 
We asked Jacek Kucharczyk, President of the 
executive board of the Warsaw-based 
Institute of Public Affairs. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung: What was the main 
reason for this shift to the right – the desire 
for political change or the conviction that 
certain challenges facing Poland could be 
better managed by Law and Justice? 
Jacek Kucharczyk: I think it was both. There 
was definitely a fatigue factor after eight years of 
the Civic Platform government. People were 
looking for an alternative, and they found this 
alternative in Law and Justice, which describes 
itself as conservative right-wing party, although 
some analysts label them as right-wing populists. 
It is not only a coincidence that voters look for an 
alternative to the centre-right Civic Platform 
further to the right. Most people in Poland define 
their political views as right-wing.  
But this is only part of the story: Law and Justice 
offered them a kind of world-view, which they 
found attractive in times of European crisis –  
I would call it, “shelter from the storm”. 
The “storm” can be exemplified by the refugee 
crisis. This came at a perfect time for Kaczyński. 
His hard line on refugees, verging on 
xenophobia, won over people who would 
normally not vote for Law and Justice. And it 
turned out that the fear of migrants actually 
prevailed not only with people with a lower 
education and in the countryside. We know from 
public opinion research that fear of migrants, 
especially from Muslim countries, is also 
widespread in big cities and among well-
educated people. This helps to explain why 
Kaczyński ’s rhetoric could break through the 
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electoral “glass ceiling” and reach out to a 
broader pool of voters.  
However, the refugee crisis is only the peak of the 
iceberg, there are other types of fears and 
prejudices which Kaczyński ’s party successfully 
exploited with his promises to shelter people from 
“evils” issuing from Western Europe and the 
world: secularisation or the so-called “gender-
ideology”, which – according to the Polish 
bishops and right-wing politicians – would destroy 
Polish family life and cultural tradition. That is 
where he attracted many voters by appealing to 
latent homophobia and sexism. 
As you mention “secularisation”, has the 
Catholic Church, which has an enormous 
impact on Polish life, played any role in the 
electoral campaign? 
I would say that during the campaign the 
presence or participation of the church and its 
officials was not very conspicuous. At least not as 
conspicuous as in earlier elections, for example 
the 2010 presidential elections. That was a kind 
of turning point then, because so many church 
officials supported Jarosław Kaczyński ’s 
unsuccessful bid for presidency after his brother’s 
death in the Smolensk aircrash. Such direct 
involvement of the Church was met with a lot of 
criticism from the general public. After that 
campaign some people called Poland “the 
republic of Parish priests”. Let me remind you of 
the success of the anti-clerical Palikot Movement, 
which came third with 10 per cent of the votes in 
the 2011 parliamentary elections. Since then, the 
church has certainly learnt its lessons and has 
refrained from being too active in electoral 
campaigns of any party.  
But the support of the church for Kaczyński 
indeed played a major, if not crucial, role in 
having him elected. The church has backed 
Kaczyński ’s party without any reservations. 
Kaczyński was sure of its support and, through 
this support, also sure of his core electorate. After 
the Palikot victory, the church launched what one 
could call a “counter-reformation programme” to 
stop the advances of secularization already 
visible in the Polish society. The church 
ideologues coined the expression “ideologia 
gender”, which was a catchphrase for everything 
that the Church disliked in modern European 
societies – not just secularisation, but women 
empowerment, LGTB rights and even in-vitro-
fertilisation. Civil-society groups supported by the 
church campaigned for more even more 
restrictive abortion laws, and Kaczyński became 
sort of the political arm of this campaign. His party 
several times tried to introduce bills with a total 
ban of abortion, including for rape victims. 
Another bill which was drafted by his party would 
ban in-vitro-fertilisation and punish doctors who 
did it with jail.  
What is interesting, during the 2015 presidential 
and parliamentary campaigns, Law and Justice 
found out that such religious conservatism was 
unpalatable to more moderate voters it wanted to 
attract and their track record in this respect 
became a liability. The Civic Platform tried to 
remind voters of the IVF bill as well as the party’s 
authoritarian constitution draft, which was first 
published during its 2005 –2007 stint in 
government. However, by that time Law and 
Justice had skilfully refocused the campaign to 
socio-economic issues, forcing the Civic Platform 
to compete in a race of ever more generous 
welfare promises. Still, the backing of the Church 
secured the loyalty of Kaczyński’s more 
religiously conservative voters and left him free to 
seek the support of other segments of the 
society. 
Is this success owed to Beata Szydlo, not 
only as a campaigner as in the presidential 
elections but as a political actor giving Law 
and Justice a more modern and less radical 
face? 
Yes, it is, to a certain extent. Many analysts 
believed that Law and Justice would be 
restrained by the “glass ceiling” and unable to 
gain more than 30 per cent of the votes, which is 
their ‘hard-core” conservative-nationalist 
electorate. Then came the successful 
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presidential campaign where Law and Justice 
suddenly had the face of Andrzej Duda; younger 
and less controversial to most voters then 
Kaczyński himself. Duda’s surprising success 
was largely due to the fact that the incumbent 
President Komorowski made such big mistakes 
in his campaigning, nonetheless his victory broke 
the glass ceiling and paved the way for success-
ful parliamentary campaign.  
Beata Szydło followed up on this. She is a new 
face, which does not alienate voters, unlike 
Kaczyński, who is one of the most distrusted 
politicians in Poland. Szydło is the friendly face of 
Law and Justice and key part of its strategy to 
shift the debate to more social issues. And this is 
the last piece of the puzzle of how Law and 
Justice won the elections. It presented a number 
of very well-targeted proposals or promises that 
addressed some of the grievances people had 
with an overall successful Civic Platform track 
record in government.  
Among these, the retirement age reform should 
be mentioned first: one of the first things former 
premier Donald Tusk did after his re-election in 
2011 was to gradually raise the retirement age to 
67. For women, this amounted to seven 
additional years. This was a very unpopular 
reform criticised by both left and right. And this 
issue was the starting point of the social promises 
Law and Justice made, which included generous 
family benefits, increasing tax credits for low 
income earners, or forcing banks to convert 
Swiss franc mortgages to Polish złoty, which 
attracted many middle-class voters. All this 
played a role and was more credible than the 
Civic Platform programme. 
But how will Law and Justice realise this 
programme? And who will pay for it? 
It seems that now Law and Justice has a bit of a 
problem how to deal with these promises, which 
at least some of their supporters took very 
seriously. We already see Law and Order 
politicans withdrawing from some of the 
promises, for example they talk of family benefits 
only for the poorest parents. But one can be sure 
that the Civic Platform, now in opposition, will 
spare no efforts to remind voters that Law and 
Justice made such commitments in no uncertain 
terms. These promises will not easily be 
forgotten. 
Moving from Polish issues to the international 
level – what effects for German-Polish and 
European-Polish relations can we expect? 
Will we see a change towards strong anti-
German rhetorics? 
This is a tricky question. Kaczyński and his party 
know that this kind of radical Germany-bashing 
did not pay in the past in Polish politics. Many 
more moderate voters did not appreciate that. It 
would alienate voters whom Law and Justice 
have just attracted, and it would put Poland on an 
awkward footing in European politics. There are 
incentives for Law and Justice not to go the way 
they went ten years ago. I think President Duda’s 
first visit to Germany was to show the friendly 
face not only to the Polish electorate, but also to 
the German partners. So hopefully we will not see 
a return to bad relations with Germany. 
But there is also another scenario: blaming 
Germany can be very attractive domestically for 
other parts of the electorate, as we have already 
seen in the migrant issue. When Kaczyński spoke 
in parliament about the refugee crisis and the 
quotas, which had been proposed by the 
European Commission, he accused Ewa Kopacz 
of giving in to “the dictate of another power”, i.e. 
Germany, If Kaczyński feels it politically 
expedient to blame Germany, he will not hesitate 
to do so. He knows how to strike the right tune 
with his voters. And I think there will be situations 
where this will be important. Take, for example, 
the Polish coal industry. Kaczyński promised to 
defend the Polish coal-mining sector, which is in 
deep trouble, and the temptation to blame 
Germany for economic unsustainability of this 
sector (of which the climate package is not the 
main reason) will be great. Therefore one 
negative but possible scenario will be that 
Kaczyński will fall back on anti-German rhetoric 
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for domestic reasons, with negative implications 
for Polish foreign policy. I hope this will not 
happen but we cannot rule that out. 
You have just mentioned the refugee issue. 
What is to be expected from the new 
government, also as regards a potential influx 
of refugees from Ukraine? 
Kaczyński will resist any further quotas. It is 
unclear what he will do with the quotas Kopacz 
already agreed to. I think they will be checking if 
there is any legal room of manœuver to go back 
on these decisions. I don’t think that they are 
aware that in case of a worsening crisis in 
Ukraine Poland may need EU help to deal with a 
possible influx of refugees from that direction and 
in this scenarios quotas would actually help us. 
This inability to recognize that deeper European 
integration, also in the field of migration and 
asylum policy, is in Poland’s interest well 
illustrates the narrow-mindedness and short-term 
thinking implicit in the Law and Justice definition 
of national interest. 
Dr Kucharczyk, thank you very much for 
these insights. 
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